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RECOVERY FOR TORTIOUS DEATH OF
THE UNBORN
On July 1, 1981, in Danos v. St. Pierre,' the Supreme Court
of Louisiana affirmed an award under Louisiana's wrongful
death statute for an in utero death that resulted from tortious
injury during the sixth month of pregnancy. The court con-
cluded that the unborn' is a child from the moment of concep-
tion.4 Six days later in Scott v. Kopp,5 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania denied recovery under Pennsylvania's wrongful
death statute for the death of a fetus from an injury en ventre
sa mere' during the eighth month of pregnancy. These decisions
exemplify the great disparity in judicial treatment of death ac-
tionS7 arising from tortious injury to an unborn.8
Because an action for wrongful death was not recognized at
common law,9 such an action must be based upon the appropri-
1. 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981).
2. The term "in utero," used widely in the literature on prenatal injury, signifies
that the child is still in his mother's womb.
3. Throughout this article the term "unborn" is utilized rather than such terms as
"embryo" or "fetus," which refer only to specific stages of gestation. See Note, The Law
and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW.
349, 350-51 (1971).
4. 402 So. 2d at 639.
5. - Pa. -, 431 A.2d 959 (1981).
6. This term appears commonly in prenatal injury literature and refers to an un-
born. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (5th ed. 1979). See note 3 supra.
7. "Death action," as used in this Note, refers to a claim under a wrongful death
statute or a survival statute. See S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH app. A (2d
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as S. SPEISER]; Note, Tort Recovery For the Unborn Child,
15 J. FA M. L. 276, 283-94 (1976). The wrongful death statute provides a relatively new
action intended to compensate those deprived of a relationship with the deceased.
Though these statutes vary among jurisdictions, the beneficiary may normally recover for
the loss of the decedent's future earnings, services, and comfort. Survival statutes con-
tinue an action that the deceased initiated or would have initiated if alive and permit
recovery for injury and pain and suffering of the decedent between the time of the tor-
tious act and death. Many jurisdictions have formed a hybrid statute by combining the
elements of recovery. See Davis, Wrongful Death, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 327, 331-36; Note,
Tort Recovery, supra, at 283-94.
8. See generally S. SPEISER, supra note 7, §§ 4:21-:38.
9. The ill-considered conclusion that English common law did not recognize an ac-
tion for wrongful death first appeared in dicta in Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campbell 493, 173
Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1808). The decision offered no rationale for this result, but two
1
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ate jurisdiction's death statute.10 The provisions of these stat-
utes vary widely among jurisdictions,, and differences in con-
struction and interpretation of the statutes are even greater. 1
This Note identifies issues that courts must confront when de-
termining whether to award damages for death resulting from
tortious prenatal injury and suggests the manner in which these
issues might be resolved.
I. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A DEATH CLAIM RESULTING FROM
ToRTIous PRENATAL INJURY
A. The Unborn as a "'Person"
A death claim is not a claim by the estate of the deceased.
12
common-law doctrines suggest a possible basis. First, under the felony-merger doctrine,
torts were deemed subsequent to an offense against the Crown. Punishment by death
following a felony conviction resulted in forfeiture of the felon's property to the state,
and nothing was left from which a civil judgment could be paid. See Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 382 (1970); S. SPEISER, supra note 7, § 1.1. Because felony
punishment in America does not include forfeiture of property to the state, the felony-
merger doctrine does not explain the absence of a common-law wrongful death action in
the United States. See 398 U.S. at 384; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 185-88 (1867); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OP THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W.
PROSSER]. Second, under the death-survival doctrine, a cause of action in tort died with
the injured party. E.g., Huggins v. Butcher, 1 Brown & Golds 205, 123 Eng. Rep. 756
(1607). See W. PROSSER, supra, § 127; Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v.
Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431 (1916). All American jurisdictions except Hawaii have adopted
the rule of Baker v. Bolton. Compare Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475
(1848) with Kate v. Houton, 2 Hawaii 209 (1860). The rule has been strongly criticized,
however, on both sides of the Atlantic. E.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S.
375 (1970) (the Court concluded that there was a cause of action for wrongful death
under the common law); Rose v. Ford, A.C. 826; Panama R. Co. v. Rock, 266 U.S. 209,
216 (1924) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Osborn v. Gillett, L.R. 8 Ex. 88, 94 (1873) (Lord
Bramwell, dissenting). See generally W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW § 3, at
676-77 (3d ed. 1927); S. SPEISER, supra note 7, § 1.6.
10. The hardship of this anomaly in the common law was remedied in England with
the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act. Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. C. 93 (1846).
Whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by [a] wrongful act ...
[which)- is such as would [had death not occurred] have entitled the party in-
jured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then...
the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable
to an action for damages.
Id. Legislation of this type has been adopted throughout the United States. See S.
SPEIsER, supra note 7, app. A. Cf. Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 71, 284 N.E.2d 222,
229 (1972) (state law on wrongful death "has ... evolved to the point where it may now
be held that the right to recovery for wrongful death is of common law origin").
11. See generally S. SPEISER, supra note 7, chs. 3, 10.
12. See id. § 1:9, app. A. The Internal Revenue Service includes neither wrongful
2
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Rather it is a cause of action of purely statutory creation that
allows the enumerated beneficiaries to recover for the tortious'
death of the deceased. Statutes generally condition these claims
on the deceased having been a "person." 13
In determining whether an unborn is a "person" for pur-
poses of a death statute, courts ordinarily focus on the intent or
purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute,14 the legal sta-
tus unborns have traditionally enjoyed in the jurisdiction,"' and
community knowledge and attitudes about the unborn.16
Many courts have found legislative intent underlying a par-
ticular statute to be determinative of the question of whether an
unborn is a "person" within the scope of the statute.1 7 Because
it is unlikely that nineteenth century legislatures gave any
thought to the unborn at the time death statutes were enacted,18
death nor survival act recoveries for decedent's death in the estate of the decedent. Rev.
Rul. 75-127, 1975-1 C.B. 297.
13. "Person" has embraced entities both inside and outside the human gene pool for
statutory and constitutional purposes. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipality is "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1887) (corporation is "person" for pur-
poses of fourteenth amendment).
"Person" can have different meanings depending on the context in which it is used.
In Ohio, for example, a viable unborn is a "person" for purposes of the wrongful death
statute, Stedam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 421, 107 N.E.2d 106 (1959), but is not a
"person" for purposes of the vehicular homicide statute. State v. Dickinson, 23 Ohio
App. 2d 259, 263 N.E.2d 253 (1970), afld, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971). But
see Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 511 Ill. 2d 368, 378, 304 N.E.2d 88, 94 (1973) (Ryan,
J., dissenting) ("person" has same meaning in both constitutional and statutory
contexts).
14. See, e.g., Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 576, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977) ("We
express no opinion with respect to the existence of the fetus as a person in either the
philosophical or scientific sense. We hold only that the legislature did not exhibit the
intention to include a viable fetus within the scope of a wrongful death statute");
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 148 N.W.2d 107, 111
(1967) (if death statute has been enacted in an era of limited knowledge of prenatal life,
exclusion of unborn from statutory coverage cannot be assumed to be consequence of
legislative intent).
15. See generally Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade,
45 Mo. L. REv. 639, 653-56 (1980); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child, supra note 2,
at 349.
16. See generally Kader, supra note 15, at 653-56; Note, The Impact of Medical
Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554 (1962).
17. Compare Cardwell v. Welsh, 25 N.C. App. 390, 392, 213 S.E.2d 382, 383 (1975)
with Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 148 N.W.2d 107,
111 (1967).
18. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 148 N.W.2d 107,
111 (1967). See Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge, supra note 16, at 563.
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focus on legislative intent affords limited guidance. Some courls
call attention to statutory derogation of the common law and
require strict construction of the statutory language, a focus that
leads to the conclusion that an unborn is not a person.19
Other courts note the remedial nature of the statute and re-
quire broad interpretation to effect this purpose.20 Additionally,
courts allowing recovery may explain that legislatures need not
provide for all possible contingencies on the face of every stat-
ute21 and that courts must effectuate the spirit as well as the
letter of the law.22 The supporting analyses in these decisions do
not explore the biological, philosophical, or theological dimen-
sions of "personhood. '23 Absent explicit statutory language indi-
cating legislative intent,2' this level of analysis offers little help
in deciding whether an unborn should be recognized as a person
for purposes of a death statute.
The legal status of the unborn in other areas of law is the
next level of authority available to courts deciding whether the
unborn is a person for purposes of a death statute. The unborn
has been accorded legal status in equity,25 criminal law,26 prop-
19. See, e.g., Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 553, 529 P.2d 706, 707 (1974); Eg-
bert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 576, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977).
20. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 99, 300 So. 2d 354, 356 (1974).
See Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death, 15 RUTGERS L.
REV. 61, 76-77 (1960).
21. Del Tufo, supra note 20, at 76-77. "The legislature must speak in general terms.
It is for the judiciary to supply content to enactments and, with respect to wrongful
death statutes, to determine as a matter of common law who is a person within the
legislature's intendment." Id. But see Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122,
139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977), in which the court reasoned that when the legislature enacts a
statute, it indicates an intention either to allow courts broad discretion in interpretation
and application or to "occupy the field" and restrict judicial initiative. Id. at 575, 565
P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
22. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 99, 300 So. 2d 354, 356 (1974).
23. E.g., Verkennes v. Cornica, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (accepting the
unborn as a person for purposes of the death statute without any logical argument);
Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 576, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977).
24. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980) (expressly recognizing a viable fetus as
a person for purposes of wrongful death statute). See Note, California's Response for
Wrongful Death of a Stillborn Fetus: Justus v. Atchison, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 589, 602-
08 (1978) (advocating revision of California's wrongful death statute to include fetuses);
Recent Developments, 45 TENN. L. REV. 545 (1978); Legislation, 18 VanD. L. REv. 847
(1965) (advocating recovery in Tennessee for wrongful death in case of stillbirth, regard-
less of viability).
25. E.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d
457 (1981) (requiring mother to have caesarean section despite contrary religious beliefs
4
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erty law,27 and tort law.28 In each of these areas, however, the
legal status of an unborn is often contingent on quickening,29 vi-
ability,30 or eventual birth.3 1 Abortion law and Roe v. Wade
3 2
provide additional legal authority from which inferences can be
drawn about the unborn's status as a person. Under Roe, "per-
because fetus, viable at thirty-nine weeks, was endangered); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan
Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985
(1964) (ordering blood transfusion for mother to save unborn despite mother's contrary
religious beliefs); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child, supra note 2, at 360-62; Note,
The Unborn Child and the Constitutional Conception of Life, 56 IowA L. REv. 994,
1000-01 (1971).
26. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1977) ("Murder is the unlawful killing
of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought"). See Note, The Law and the
Unborn Child, supra note 2, at 362-69; Note, The Constitutional Conception of Life,
supra note 25, at 1001-03.
27. E.g., Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1798). Responding to the
contention that an unborn is a nonentity, the court observed:
Let us see, what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in a recovery
though it is for the purpose of making him answer over in value. He may be an
executor. He may take under the Statute of Distributors .... He may take by
devise. He may be entitled under a charge for raising portions. He may have an
injunction; and he may have a guardian.
Id. at 163. See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child, supra note 2, at 351-54; Note, The
Constitutional Conception of Life, supra note 25, at 999-1000.
28. E.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hoasp., 40 IM. App. 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976), aff'd,
67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (allowing recovery by a child for prenatal harm
caused by negligent preconception blood transfusion received by mother); Kelly v. Greg-
ory, 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953) (allowing recovery for all postconception pre-
natal injuries to a liveborn child). See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child, supra note
2, at 354-60; Note, The Constitutional Conception of Life, supra note 25, at 996-99.
29. Although the approach is now in disfavor, some cases require that the unborn be
quick at the time of the injury to maintain a tort action for prenatal harm. E.g.,
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 438, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (1951) (similar requirement
of quickness made under criminal law); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 222-23, 133
N.E. 567, 567 (1921) ("By the criminal law, ... it is a great crime to kill the child after
it is able to stir in the mother's womb").
30. This distinction is disappearing. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 Ill.
App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976), aff'd, 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (allowing
recovery for injuries resulting from tort committed before conception); Kelly v. Gregory,
282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953) (extending liability to all tortious injuries occur-
ring after conception).
31. Property law generally recognizes the unborn as an heir even if birth occurs af-
ter the decedents death. An unborn's right to participate in an estate is usually contin-
gent on live birth. Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834); CAL. PROB. CODE §
123 (West 1956). See Note, The Law and The Unborn Child, supra note 2, at 351-54;
Note, The Constitutional Conception of Life, supra note 25, at 999-1000.
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). One commentator has asserted that Roe is not a constitu-
tional law decision. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
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son" as used in the fourteenth amendment 3 does not include
the unborn.34 Although Roe may be cited for the proposition
that states may deny recovery for death of a nonviable fetus,35
Roe is a federal constitutional decision rather than a tort or
death statute decision and does not compel its interpretation of
"person" in decisions of the latter types.36 Furthermore, the use
of Roe in death statute cases may be attacked as circular.3 7 Roe
relied in part on prenatal death authority inaccurately repre-
sented by Dean Prosser3" for the conclusion that the unborn was
not considered or intended to be a person under the law. In
turn, some modern prenatal death decisions cite Roe's conclu-
sion for the same proposition.3
The final area by which courts may be guided when decid-
ing whether the unborn is a person is the knowledge and atti-
tudes of the community. As Justice Holmes observed: "[t]he life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. '40 The ex-
perience to which Justice Holmes referred is the accumulation of
knowledge in all areas of a society and the attitudes such knowl-
edge generates. Modern medicine now regards the unborn as a
separate though dependent entity from the moment of concep-
tion.4' With the help of currently available life support technol-
33. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. See Kader, supra note 15, at 656.
35. Kader, supra note 15, at 659.
36. Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 312, 237 N.W.2d 297, 305 (1975) (Maher, J.,
dissenting) ("The narrow question this case presents is how broad is the word 'person' in
our state's wrongful death act. The constitutional question decided in Roe v. Wade...
is unconnected to the statutory question at hand").
37. Kader, supra note 15, at 658.
38. Id. at 653-56. The cited authority accompanying Dean Prosser's discussion of
prenatal injuries is incomplete and inaccurate. Prosser cites five cases on each side of the
issue of recovery for prenatal death but fails to indicate that a majority of jurisdictions
favored recovery. Id. at 654. Also,
[ijn footnote 36,. . . Prosser cites seven law review articles, implying that they
likewise oppose recovery. The Supreme Court apparently accepted that impli-
cation, concluding that a majority of the commentators opposed recovery.
While three of the articles do in fact approve of decisions denying recovery,
one other article is not relevant to the question, and three argue for recovery
for wrongful death of a stillborn fetus.
Id.
39. Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 237 N.W.2d 297 (1975); Hamby v. McDaniel,
559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1977).
40. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 55, at 336 n.16.
[Vol. 33
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ogy, an unborn may be able to survive outside the mother's
womb after as few as twenty-five weeks of gestation and at a
weight of less than 400 grams or fourteen ounces. 42 In addition,
the medical community now has the ability safely to monitor
and test the unborn from the earliest stages of pregnancy.43 In
response, parents typically show concern for the unborn and de-
velop emotional ties from the moment they are aware of its exis-
tence.44 Parental concern with the unborn has increased with ad-
vances in medical science, and this reality supports inclusion of
the unborn within the meaning of death statutes.
Courts faced with deciding whether an unborn is a person
under a death statute have found strong arguments for recogni-
tion of the unborn as a person.45 Other courts, in jurisdictions
that have interpreted their death statutes as inapplicable to un-
borns must determine the proper response when confronted with
the opportunity to reinterpret a death statute. The alternatives
are reinterpreting "person" to include the unborn46 or deferring
to the legislature for any change.4
Courts in a majority of the states have reinterpreted death
statutes to include the unborn but have limited the application
of the statutes to viable unborns.4 8 While this approach recog-
42. Ismach, The Smallest Patients, MED. WORLD NEWS, Sept. 14, 1981, at 28, 29.
43. See notes 90-93 and accompanying text infra.
44. An interesting example of this phenomenon occurs in the case of "test tube"
babies whose parents have sought the extreme remedy of artificial fertilization and im-
plantation of the ovum in order to have children.
45. See note 48 infra.
46. E.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 586, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97,
111 (1977) (Tobriner, J., concurring); O'Neill v. Mouse, 385 Mich. 130, 134, 188 N.W.2d
785, 786 (1971); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
If judges of later years who examine the problem [of liability for prenatal in-
jury] anew with the aid of recent judicial opinions, advanced medical knowl-
edge, and the views of many eminent legal scholars "reach a contrary conclu-
sion they must be ready to discharge their own judicial responsibilities in
conformance with modern concepts and needs."
Id. at 362, 157 A.2d at 501. See also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 389-
92 (1970); B. CARDoZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1921).
47. E.g., Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 554, 529 P.2d 706, 708 (1974); Justus V.
Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 579, 565 P.2d 122, 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 107 (1977); State ex
rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199
Neb. 573, 576, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 393,
213 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1975).
48. Twenty-seven jurisdictions allow recovery for stillbirth of a viable child. See
Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 94, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26
Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (Super. Ct. 1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50
7
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nizes the courts' responsibility for interpreting statutory lan-
guage in a manner that is consistent with modern understand-
ing,4e it may nevertheless be argued that legislative inaction
implies satisfaction with prior decisions denying recovery.50
Moreover, permitting the legislature to act allows democratic in-
put into a decision that reorders societal relationships. This ap-
proach affords notice of any change and allows potential
tortfeasors and insurance companies to adjust their insurance
coverage with a minimum of economic dislocation. These advan-
tages may, however, be offset by delay and additional harm to
beneficiaries. Finally, as a practical matter, enactment of appro-
priate legislation may be difficult in the face of anticipated in-
surance company lobbying and in light of the related contro-
Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955);
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150
Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962);
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La.
1981); State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Mone v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Verkennes v. Cornica, 229
Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954);
White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Polinquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104,
135 A.2d 249 (1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 147, 619 P.2d 823 (1980);
Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d
924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 635 (1974); Presley
v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608,
138 S.E.2d 432 (1964); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., Inc., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d
92 (1980); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher,
155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34
Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980).
Twelve jurisdictions expressly disallow recovery for stillbirth of a viable child.
Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d
564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); Stem v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977);
McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Toth v. Goree, 65 Minn. App. 296,
237 N.W.2d 297 (1975); State ex rel. Hardin v. Sandirs, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976);
Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 2041
A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Scott v. Kopp, - Pa.
-, 431 A.2d 959 (1981); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440
(1969).
Twelve jurisdictions have not considered the question: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyo-
ming. But see Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962) (denying recovery for
death of nonviable fetus).
49. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946).
50. Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 576, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977); Hamby v. Mc-
Daniel, 559 S.W.2d 774, 776-77 (Tenn. 1977). But see Recent Developments, 45 TENN. L.
REv. 545 (1978).
8
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versy associated with abortion. 1
Inclusion of the unborn within death statutes and expansion
of their application beyond viable unborns should not be viewed
by the courts as radical steps. The basic tort law concept of cau-
sation remains available to stem the flood of litigation and to
ensure just adjudication of climsM.
52
B. Viability
The viability of the unborn at the time of injury has been a
significant issue in nearly all the decisions in which beneficiaries
have sought recovery for the tortious death of an unborn.5 3 The
concept of viability was first advanced in 1900 in Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital" and had its initial effect on death actions in
1949 in Verkennes v. Cornica 5 The viability distinction has a
strong intuitive basis; it seems unfair to deny recovery when the
stillborn child was capable of independent existence at the time
of the fatal injury. 6 Furthermore, if some limitation on liability
is necessary,57 viability avoids the constitutional uncertainty of
an arbitrary determination that personhood begins at birth.5 8
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Smith v. Brennan9 of-
fered a critical view of the rationale underlying the adoption of
the viability requirement:
51. See notes 143-149 and accompanying text infra.
52. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, ch. 7. See notes 78-95 and accompanying text infra.
53. See note 48 supra. But see Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100
(1955) (court recognized cause of action for tortious injury resulting in death after
quickening).
54. 184 IM. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
55. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
56. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 366, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960).
57. E.g., Scott v. Kopp, - Pa. , -, 431 A.2d 959, 961 (1981). See V. HARPER &
F. JAMEs, TORTS § 18.3 (1956). But see S. SPEISER, supra note 7, § 4:37 (criticizing the
Harper & James approach).
58. The command of constitutional equal protection is that the law treat alike
those who are similarly situated .... Classification for benefit is constitution-
ally permissible only if the classification bears some rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose.. . . The California wrongful death statute... [was
intended] to compensate survivors of the victim and to deter conduct in this
state which wrongfully takes life.... The requirement of live birth of the in-
dividual killed has no rational relationship to the most grevious tort of
all-that which inflicts death upon its victim.
Justus v. Atchison, 126 Cal. Rptr. 150, 161 (1975) (Cobey, J., dissenting). See Del Tufo,
supra note 20, at 71.
59. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
80519821
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Although the viability distinction has no real justification, it is
explainable historically. . . . The first dissent from this pro-
position, by Justice Boggs in the Allaire case, pointed out that
an unborn who could sustain life apart from its mother could
not be considered part of her. The logical appeal of Justice
Boggs' approach, coupled with the understandable conserva-
tism of the earlier courts who broke with the Dietrich theory,
resulted in a rule of recovery limited by the viability
distinction."
A disadvantage of the viability requirement lies in the in-
consistency among determinations of the point of viability. Via-
bility is contingent upon a number of elements, including the
characteristics of the unborn such as its period of gestation,
weight, health, and hereditary makeup;"' characteristics of the
mother such as her age, weight, and health;62 and the quality of
available postnatal care, that is, the sophistication of local medi-
cal treatment and the competence of the attending physician. 3
As a result, a nearly full-term unborn with certain health com-
plications whose mother lives in a medically impoverished area
may not be viable, but an unborn for whom sophisticated medi-
cal treatment is available may be viable before the completion of
the fifth month of pregnancy. 4 Substitution of the Roe v.
Wade"5 rationale on viability would do little to resolve present
inconsistencies because the Supreme Court has since rejected 6
the three tests for viability identified in Roe.6 7 Although difficul-
ties with the viability requirement might be glossed over with
the assertion that the issue of viability is a question of fact to be
60. Id. at 368, 157 A.2d at 504. See, e.g., V. HARPER & F. JAmES, supra note 51, §
18.3; W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 55; Del Tufo, supra note 20, at 78-79; Note, The
Impact of Medical Knowledge, supra note 16, at 562-b4.
61. See generally Ismach, supra note 42, at 28; Note, The Impact of Medical
Knowledge, supra note 16, at 554.
62. See note 56 supra.
63. See Kader, supra note 15, at 658 n.102.
64. Id. at 658 n.102.
65. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66. See Colantti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (striking down a state's attempt to
incorporate the twenty-fourth to twenty-eighth week of gestation test into its abortion
statute).
67. Roe recognized that viability is reached six to twelve weeks after quickening,
when the unborn has the capacity for meaningful life outside the womb, or between the
twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth week of gestation. 410 U.S. at 160.
806 [Vol. 33
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resolved by a preponderance of the evidence,"' this argument ig-
nores the nature of the death action-a means by which to com-
pensate beneficiaries or parents for their loss-and raises serious
constitutional equal protection issues.6 9
With the development of refined techniques 0 and sophisti-
cated prenatal testing,71 death claims are now, even more than
previously, subject to a concern that originally led to the adop-
tion of the viability requirement: the potential for speculative or
ill-founded recoveries in prenatal actions.7 2 The viability re-
quirement purports to separate inherently speculative claims
based on injuries occurring before viability 3 from inherently
meritorious claims based on postviability injuries. 4 Advances in
medicine have added greater certainty to the proof of causation
and other tort elements while at the same time rendering the
determination of viability less certain.
If a standard limiting liability is necessary or desirable,
what are the alternatives to viability? Perhaps a return to tradi-
tional tort analysis-tortious conduct linked to the injury by
factual and legal causation, 5 which is the touchstone in most
other areas of personal injury, would supply an adequate stan-
dard. The concept of viability has fallen from use in the analysis
of other prenatal injuries and, absent contrary legislative provi-
sion, should also be eliminated in the area of the death statute
claim."7
68. The Illinois Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that viability of a four-
teen-week-old unborn is a question for the jury as trier of fact. Green v. Smith, 71 In. 2d
501, 505-06, 377 N.E.2d 37, 39 (1978).
69. See note 58 supra. In a given jurisdiction, parents of a fourteen-week-old unborn
may be allowed to recover, while parents of a nine-month-old unborn might be denied
recovery based on separate jury determinations of viability. Such disparate treatment of
equally situated parties would appear to raise a serious equal protection issue.
70. See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, ch. 7.
71. See generally S. ROBBINS & M. ANGELL, BASIC PATHOLOGY (2d ed. 1976); notes
90-93 and accompanying text infra.
72. See notes 90-93 and accompanying text infra.
73. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
74. See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900) (Boggs,
J., dissenting); Verkennes v. Cornica, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
75. See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Inl. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900) (Boggs,
J., dissenting); Verkennes v. Cornica, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
76. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
77. The justification for eliminating the viability requirement from actions for pre-
natal injuries that do not result in an unborn's death was the inherent unfairness of
disallowing recovery when an individual faced lifelong physical impairment as a result of
1982]
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C. Causation
The first comment on the difficulties of proving causation
appeared in 1891:
[T]here are instances in the law where rules of right are
founded upon the inherent and inevitable difficulty or impossi-
bility of proof. And it is easy to see on what a boundless sea of
speculation in evidence this new idea would launch us. What a
field would be open to extravagance of testimony, already great
enough-if Science could carry her lamp, not over certain in its
light where people have their eyes, into the unseen laboratory
of nature-could profess to reveal the causes and things that
are hidden there .... But it is also a landmark that forbids
advance on defined rights and engagements; and if these rights
are to be altered, if new rights and engagements are to be cre-
ated, that is the province of legislation and not of decision.7 8
The difficulties of proving legal and factual causation7 have
played a large role in death actions for prenatal injuries,80 yet
the law of directly related evidentiary problems has not been ad-
equately explored."" One commentator has noted that "[iln part
this may be explained by the fact that many of the reported
cases were settled without trial after an appellate court decided
tortiously inflicted injuries. The viability requirement in death actions by beneficiaries of
the unborn permits infliction of loss or harm without any compensation to the injured
party. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
78. Walker v. Great N. Ry., 28 L.R. Ir. 69, 81-82 (Q.B. 1891) (O'Brian, J., concur-
ring). Early courts that adopted the "province of legislation" argument to deny prenatal
injury remedies were in fact acting legislatively. If the courts limited themselves to the
case or controversy before them, they may not have been confronted with a speculative
or fictitious claim. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Early decisions approximated
advisory opinions because they addressed not the particular facts or issues raised by an
individual case but the larger issue of speculative or fictitious claims, which was not
squarely before the court. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968).
79. Legal causation is the reasonable foreseeability requirement of all negligence
tort actions. Its purpose is to limit an actor's liability to injuries or harms that are fore-
seeable at the time he acts. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 42. Factual causation is gener-
ally a "but for" test, tracing the actor's conduct to the eventual harm or injury. Id. § 40.
80. See Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944
(1935), overruled by, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967);
Walker v. Great N. Ry., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891). One court has observed that the only
reason for the old rule on recovery for prenatal injury was the difficulty of proof. Stem-
mer v. Kline, 19 N.J. Misc. 15, 17 A.2d 58 (Cir. Ct. 1940), rev'd, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d
489 (1942). See Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge, supra note 16, at 560.
81. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge, supra note 16, at 594.
[Vol. 33
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that a cause of action existed." 2
Many courts have abandoned the speculation argument and
have allowed recovery for prenatal injuries by relying on medical
knowledge to fill previous gaps in proof.83 This shift has been
accomplished with a variety of justifications: (1) difficulty in
proof should not affect substantive rights;84 (2) the rules of evi-
dence are adequate to prevent fictitious claims; 5 (3) proof is no
more difficult in a prenatal injury case than in other personal
injury cases;88 and (4) advances in medicine now justify
recovery.
87
Expert testimony is ordinarily required to establish causa-
tion"8 unless the cause and effect relationship is unmistakable.8 9
Previously, external manifestation of injury to an unborn could
not be discerned until after delivery, but ultrasound, 90 amni-
ocentesis,9 " x-ray,92 and other available techniques93 may now es-
82. Id.
83. Id. at 560.
84. See, e.g., Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 356, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951). In a
pre-Bonbrest case, Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 637, 92 P.2d 678, 682
(1939), a California Court of Appeals suggested that if proof is more difficult in prenatal
injury cases, courts should make it easier to sustain a claim.
85. See, e.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 437, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (1951);
Montreal Tramways Co. v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337, 346 (Can.).
86. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 365, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960); Cooper v.
Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923) (furnished for publication 1949). See W. PROS-
SER, supra note 9, at 336; Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge, supra note 16, at
577.
The problem of proof, therefore, is basically no different in these cases than it
was when only the mother had a cause of action. The causal relationship be-
tween the accident and the miscarriage must be shown, to establish a chain of
causation from the negligent conduct to the damage suffered by the fetus.
Id. at 577.
87. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPhee-
ters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 637, 92 P.2d 678, 683 (1939); Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 125-26, 97 N.E.2d 334, 339 (1949). See Note, The Impact
of Medical Knowledge, supra note 16, at 562.
88. See, e.g., Superior Transfer Co. v. Halstead, 189 Md. 536, 539-40, 56 A.2d 706,
706 (1948); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge, supra note 16, at 588.
89. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge, supra note 16, at 577. See generally
C. MCCORMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (2d ed. 1972). A judge and jury
may rely on common knowledge and experience and may ignore relevant expert testi-
mony on causation. Miami Coal Co. v. Luce, 76 Ind. App. 245, 249, 131 N.E. 824, 826
(1921).
90. Hirshhorn, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disease, in DEVELOPMENT GENETICS
87, 93 (C. Fenoglio, R. Goodman & D. King eds. 1976).
91. See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 424, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979); Friedman, Legal
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tablish the trauma or injury immediately after an accident. Sim-
ilar advances in pathology might create still more objective data
for evaluating causation of an unborn's death.9' These advances
in medical knowledge and diagnostic techniques are not only ef-
fective in establishing liability but are useful in exculpating
defendants.95
D. Damages
Evaluation of damages has been particularly difficult in
death actions resulting from prenatal injuries. Issues essential to
the determination of damages include an appreciation that the
death action is a vindication of the parents' rights or a remedy
for their loss,96 a solution to the mother's double recovery prob-
lem,97 and quantification of pecuniary loss.9 8
The death action is intended to benefit the survivor of the
decedent.99 Because its purpose is to compensate for the survi-
vor's loss, the concepts of viability and live birth are of limited
Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 92 (1974).
92. E.g., Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465, 467 (E.D.S.C. 1960) (fetal head
shown to have been locus of maternal injury).
93. See Goodner, Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis: Present and Future, 19 CLIN. OBST.
& GYN. 965, 965-76 (1976). See generally Diagnostic Imaging, MEDICAL WORLD NEws
Mar. 2, 1981, at 67.
94. See generally S. RoBBINS & M. ANGELL, supra note 71.
95. E.g., Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959)
(expert testimony on the cause of Mongolism sufficient to eliminate possibility that acci-
dent caused condition). C7f. Montreal Tramways Co. v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337
(Can.) (cause of action allowed for club foot allegedly caused by accident during eighth
month of pregnancy would today be recognized as a congenital deformity).
96. See generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 162; Del Tufb, supra note 20, at 78; Recent De-
velopments, 70 MICH. L. Rov. 729, 742 (1972).
97. See Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 359, 331 N.E.2d 916, 919
(1975); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 248 N.E.2d 901, 904, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65,
69 (1969); Recent Developments, 21 VILL. L. Rzv. 994, 999 (1976).
98. But see Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); S. SPEsE,
supra note 7, §§ 4:22, 4:32, 4:33. Recovery under the death statute is generally limited to
pecuniary losses, which may be loosely characterized as economic losses. Note, Blind
Limitation of the Past: An Analysis of Pecuniary Damages in Wrongful Death Actions,
49 DEN. L.J. 99 (1972).
99. The types and combinations of these statutes vary widely among jurisdictions.
See generally S. SPEISR, supra note 7, app. A; Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, The
Death of Children: A Nonparametric Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish,
74 COLUM. L. REv. 884, 885-86 (1974); Note, Tort Recovery for the Unborn Child, 15 J.
FAM. L. 276, 283-94 (1976-77).
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importance.' 0 As Justice Blackmun noted in Roe v. Wade, "an
[unborn death] action ... would appear to be one to vindicate
the parent's interest .... The fetus ... represents only the po-
tentiality of life."''1 Although, the parents' interest in an un-
born's potential life is unaffected by the state of the unborn's
development, development might affect the magnitude of loss.'
0 2
The issue of double recovery arises when a mother seeks a
recovery for her own personal injuries"°a and receives an award
that includes compensation for the loss of her unborn.1'0 4 A sepa-
rate death action might arguably result in an "unjustified wind-
fall or bounty"'10 5 or a punitive recovery 0 6 contrary to the intent
of the statute. Nevertheless, the interests involved-recovery for
the mother's bodily injury and immediate mental distress and
recovery for pecuniary or personal loss inflicted by the death of
the unborn child-are separate.'0 7 Moreover, the personal injury
action has its source in common law while the death action is
statutory and is therefore not limited by common-law doc-
trines.'08 Some legislatures have allowed attorney's fees,' 09 puni-
100. See, e.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 IlM. 2d 368, 373, 304 N.E.2d 88, 91
(1973); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 360, 331 N.E.2d 916, 920 (1975);
Del Tufo, supra note 20, at 78; Recent Developments, supra note 97, at 997-98.
101. 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). See Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 365, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 212, 215 (1972) (Brown, J., dissenting). "The mother's claim for general damages
for her injury does not embrace the real loss-the deprivation of parenthood." Id. at 367-
68, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
102. See Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019, 1024 (La. App. 1980) (Lottinger, J.,
concurring). "[V]iability is one of the factors to which courts should look in determining
the nature and extent of damages in each particular case." Id. at 1029. See Recent De-
velopments, supra note 97, at 1002-03. See also Note, The Impact of Medical
Knowledge, supra note 16, at 562 n.57.
103. Pregnant women have traditionally been allowed to recover for tortious injuries
resulting in miscarriage. See, e.g., Thomas v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58 P. 315 (1899); Finer v.
Nichols, 158 Mo. App. 539, 138 S.W. 889 (1911).
104. See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 55; Recent Developments, 70 MICH. L. REv.
729, 748 (1972); Recent Developments, supra note 97, at 999.
105. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 248 N.E.2d 901, 904, 301 N.Y.S.2d
65, 69 (1969). See Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REv. 579, 594-95 (1965)
(any award to parents of an unborn in a death action constitutes "duplicity").
106. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Fried-
berg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Carrol v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47,
202 A.2d 9 (1964).
107. See Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 359, 331 N.E.2d 916, 919
(1975).
108. See notes 26-33 "and accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 26-33 and accompanying text supra. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-
27-910 (1976) (allowing attorney's fees in suits to recover excess utility payments).
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tive damages,11 or other damages awards that go beyond exact
compensation. Any further difficulty in reconciling the double
recovery problem might be resolved by requiring that the ac-
tions be consolidated"1 or that defendants bear the responsibil-
ity of moving for consolidation if separate actions are pending.
1 12
Damages under death statutes are ordinarily limited to pe-
cuniary loss."1 3 When the decedent is an unborn, pecuniary loss,
which is normally associated with economic loss, is difficult to
quantify.1 14 Disallowing recovery for pecuniary loss associated
with a child's death may result from a belief that no amount
could adequately compensate parents for loss of companion-
ship"' and from fear of excessive awards and increased insur-
ance premiums.""' These concerns have been responsible for in-
consistency in awards at both the trial and appellate levels. The
dramatic variation in awards by trial courts within the same ju-
risdiction seems to suggest a selective judicial repeal of the strict
pecuniary loss doctrine.11 7 One commentator has challenged the
validity of the pecuniary loss rule on due process and equal pro-
tection grounds.118 Appellate courts have responded to the pecu-
110. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-40 (1976) (allowing punitive damages in an
action for wrongful death). When legislatures originally created death actions, they were
probably not aware of potential double recovery issues that now arise when such a stat-
ute is applied to unborn death actions. Thus, application of death statutes is not com-
pletely analogous to application of other statutory remedial damages provisions. See note
109 supra. Nevertheless, the distinction points out the lack of care with which jurists use
the double recovery argument.
111. See S. SPEIsER, supra note 7, app. A; Note, Tort Recovery for the Unborn
Child, 15 J. FAM. L. 276, 283-94 (1976).
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
113. Note, Pecuniary Damages in Wrongful Death Actions, supra note 98, at 99.
Economic loss resulting from the death of an unborn is difficult to value and has been
condemned as barbaric, requiring computation of "child-labor." See, e.g., Wycko v.
Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 337, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1960); Gary v. Schwartz, 72 Misc. 2d
332, 343, 339 N.Y.S.2d 39, 50 (1972); W. PaOSSER, supra note 9, § 127.
114. See Comment, Damages for Wrongful Death of Children, 22 U. CHI. L. REv.
549, 549-50 (1955); Finkelstein, Pickrel, & Glasser, supra note 99, at 885.
115. See Comment, supra note 114, at 549-50.
116. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 127,. at 907-08.
117. See, e.g., Schreck v. State, 35 Misc. 2d 929, 231 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1962) (three
awards of $0, one of $3,250, and one of $10,975, all also including funeral expenses, for
death of five boys in state epileptic institution). See generally Finkelstein, Pickrel, &
Glasser, supra note 99, at 884.
118. Finkelstein, Pickrel, & Glasser, supra note 99, at 893. See generally Gunther,
In Search of an Evolving Doctrine in a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1972). Exclusion of punitive damages from death action
16
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niary limitation by expanding its scope to include loss of society
or companionship.'1 9 This judicial expansion suggests the exis-
tence of a broader societal belief that parents suffer a compensa-
ble loss when an unborn is tortiously killed, even if economic
loss cannot be established. 120 Legislative action is needed to in-
corporate this social value into death statutes in order to avoid
the intermittent and uncertain justice caused by the disparity
among conclusions reached by particular judges or jurisdictions.
When addressing the issue of actual loss or injury, courts
should focus primarily on identifying the elements that are rele-
- vant to determining the amount of loss1  rather than on the
scarcity of elements from which damages may be computed.
1 22
Elements that merit consideration include the mother's history
of spontaneous abortion, 23 the stage of pregnancy at which the
fatal prenatal injury occurs, 24 the number of children the par-
ents presently have,12 5 the probability of the pregnancy reaching
full term,' 2 the mother's ability to conceive following the in-
jury, 127 the prenatal care that was administered,1 28 the use of ar-
recoveries has spawned numerous constitutional challenges to the pecuniary damages
limitation of the statutes. E.g., Johnson v. International Harvester Co., 487 F. Supp. 1176
(D.N.D. 1980) (North Dakota death statute does not violate equal protection clauses of
United States or North Dakota Constitutions by excluding punitive damages); In re
Paris Aircraft, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980)
(wrongful death statute violated equal protection clauses by excluding punitive
damages).
119. See, e.g., Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974); Wycko v.
Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d
210 (1980); S. SPEISER, supra note 6, § 4:32; Note, Wrongful Death Damages: Recovery
of Investment in and Society and Companionship of a Child, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 355
(1966).
120. Parilis v. Feinstein, 49 N.Y.2d 984, 406 N.E.2d 1059, 429 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1980)
($50,000 recovery awarded for minor's death without direct evidence of loss).
121. At present not all courts use these tools. E.g., McFarland v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
241 La. 15, 26, 127 So. 2d 183, 187 (1961) (court forbade use of factors in evaluating
pecuniary loss on ground that loss cannot be scientifically measured).
122. See Recent Developments, 70 MicH. L. Rav. 729, 744-45 (1972).
123. Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019, 1024, 1030-31 n.15 (La. Ct. App. 1980)
(Lottinger, J., concurring). See Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge, supra note 16,
at 578.
124. Danos, 383 So. 2d at 1030 n.15.
125. Id. at 1030 n.15.
126. Id. at 1030 n.15.
127. This information is relevant in determining the emotional impact or loss that
the parents have suffered.
128. Danos, 383 So. 2d at 1030 n.15.
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tificial means to induce pregnancy,"' and parental preparation
for the expected child. 130 These criteria can reduce the specula-
tive nature of recoveries and enhance the certainty of the
amount of recovery. As a result, settlement of unborn death ac-
tion cases might be encouraged and litigation reduced. 131
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN UNBORN DEATH ACTIONS
A. Roe v. Wade
The irrelevance of Roe v. Wade 3 2 to unborn death actions
may be inferred from the numerous post-Roe decisions that do
not rely on it. 133 The development of a coherent theory of the
legal status of the unborn, however, requires a thorough analysis
of Roe's limitations. 34 The conflict between a mother's right in-
tentionally to terminate her pregnancy before the unborn's via-
bility and a parent's right to recover against a tortfeasor for fatal
injury to an unborn before viability seems irreconcilable. 3 5 Yet,
one commentator has noted that
[a] close examination of the interests at stake in each context
reveals that not only is a system of tort liability for harm to
the unborn readily accommodated within the constitutional
framework established in Roe, indeed, such a system, if prop-
erly tailored, can actually enhance the state's ability to protect
those interests recognized by the Court as legitimate and com-
pelling in certain situations.13
6
A mother's right to an abortion before the unborn's viability
129. Id. at 1030 n.15.
130. Id, at 1030-31 n.15 ("i.e., house additions, baby crib and any other indicia of
the degree of expectation exuded by the parents"). Many of the traditional elements for
evaluating pecuniary loss such as sex, life expectancy, parental economic status, and pre-
sent earning capacity have been omitted from this analysis because of their irrelevance
to the determination of actual loss from the tortious death of an unborn.
131. As a practical matter, a jury might be encouraged to work through the proper
analysis, and emotional aberrations in verdicts might be controlled, if proper interrogato-
ries or special verdicts were required in this area. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
132. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
133. E.g., Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981). See Kader, supra note 15,;
at 650-62. But see Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 237 N.W.2d 297 (1975).
134. See Kader, supra note 15, at 658.
135. See Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 303-04, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1976).
136. Kader, supra note 15, at 666.
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is based on her privacy interest in controlling her pregnancy.13
The right to maintain a pregnancy for its full term without in-
terference is arguably a correlative interest. 138 Excusing a
mother from liability in a death action for a legal abortion pre-
serves her privacy interest, but no similar interest protects the
tortfeasor, I s9 whose acts result in prenatal death. Similarly,
under the doctrine of Roe, a father's consent to a legal abortion
before viability may be inferred. 140 After viability, it is likely
that a father's consent would not be implied and that a death
claim by him against the mother and her physician would be
recognized 14  unless the abortion had been performed to pre-
serve the mother's health or life.1' 2
Consequently, it appears that Roe v. Wade is not inconsis-
tent with death actions against third-party tortfeasors for prena-
tal injuries inflicted at any time during the pregnancy. Roe also
allows tort actions against a mother by the father or other statu-
tory beneficiary when an unborn has been illegally aborted.
B. The Proposed Right to Life Statute and Amendment
Passage of the proposed federal "right to life" statute1 3 or
137. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-55. See Kader, supra note 15, at 664.
138. Kader, supra note 15, at 665. This assertion involves the presumption of an
absence of a compelling state interest, such as one in the mother's health or life. See
Galebach, A Human Life Statute, 7 HUMAN LIFE RaV. 3, 14 (1981).
139. Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 312, 237 N.W. 2d 297, 305 (1975) (Maher, J.,
dissenting); Kader, supra note 15, at 657; Recent Cases, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 266, 273
(1977).
140. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (a state cannot re-
quire a father's consent to an abortion); Herko v. Uviller, 203 Misc. 108, 114 N.Y.S.2d
618 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1952) (father's consent to an abortion can be implied). The
consent problem is discussed in Comment, The New York Abortion Reform Law: Con-
siderations Application and Legal Consequences-More Than We Bargained For?, 35
ALB. L. REv. 644, 661-62 (1971).
141. Kader, supra note 15, at 665. "[T]he state would presumably be free to protect
the viable fetus' potentiality of life by recognizing a wrongful death action for its abor-
tion so long as the abortion were not performed to preserve the health or life of the
woman." Id. See also Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981)
(father sued the mother on behalf of son for damage to son's teeth by the mother's negli-
gent use of drug during pregnancy).
142. Kader, supra note 15, at 665.
143. E.g., S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-3 (1981) ("[H]uman life shall be deemed
to exist from conception"). Compare Galebach, supra note 130, and Senator East, Ques-
tions and Answers on S. 158, the Human Life Bill (embargoed until Apr, 23, 1981) (on
file with University of South Carolina Law Review) with Cox, Don't Overrule the Court,
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amendment 44 would require courts to ensure that state death
statutes conform. Two right to life standards have been sug-
gested. The proposed law would prohibit all abortions by recog-
nizing an unborn's standing as an individual with constitutional
rights from the moment of conception.145 This proposal would
preclude all abortions and would permit a father to bring a
death action against the mother and her physician if an abortion
were performed. The proposed amendment would permit the
states to enact legislation controlling abortion and related
problems;146 it would be permissive rather than affirmative in
nature. Under this proposal, the present status of unborn death
actions would be unaltered absent affirmative state legislation.
147
If a state legislature could prohibit abortions altogether, a wo-
man who obtained an abortion and her physician might be liable
to the father for the unborn's death. 148 Similarly, both the
mother and the physician might be liable to the child, in the
event of its survivial, for any injury resulting from an attempted
abortion.1
49
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1981, at 18. See Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection, 27 STA. L. REv. 603 (1975); Monaghan, The Supreme Court
1974 Term, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1975).
144. E.g., Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution to Protect Unborn Chil-
dren: Hearings on S. J. Res. 119 & S. J. Res. 130 Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
145. A constitutional amendment of this type, if ratified, would be beyond judicial
review, but a similar federal statute might not withstand judicial scrutiny. See Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) ("[U.S. CONST. amend XIV,] § 5 does not grant
Congress power to exercise discretion in the other directon and to enact 'statutes so as in
effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court' "). Id. at 651
n.10.
146. E.g., S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-3 (1981).
147. [T]he choice should turn on whether the life of the unborn is more impor-
tant than the right of the mother to decide whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. The proposed statute leaves this choice to the states, informed by
Congress's judgment that unborn children are human life and human persons.
Galebach, supra note 138, at 24.
148. A woman who obtains a legal abortion is presumably immune from an unborn
death action. "Medical advances may increase the number of affirmative acts which the
physician will be required to take for the welfare of the fetus [unborn]." Note, The Im-
pact of Medical Knowledge, supra note 16, at 583. "[Tjhe mother might bear ... re-
sponsibility ... [for] careless exposure to infectious diseases, maintaining an inadequate
diet, obesity, using narcotics, excessive smoking, or any other practice leading to a mate-
rial imbalance ... affect[ing] the fetus adversely." Id. See Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich.
App. 378, 301 N.W,2d 869 (1981).
149. See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900) ("If
the action can be maintained, it necessarily follows that an infant may maintain an ac-
20




Recovery for prenatal death has been and will remain con-
troversial. Nevertheless, this type of recovery deserves a place
within tort law as a means of relieving the injury to parents
caused by the loss of an unborn. Restrictive interpretations of
the meaning of "person" in a death statute and reliance on the
antiquated concept of viability add nothing to a sound resolu-
tion of the controversy. Instead with proper regard for constitu-
tional limitations, courts must focus on the issues of causation
and damages to resolve the confficting interests and the philo-
sophical dilemma presented by tortious prenatal death.
Tyler J. Scofield
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